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Britain, Egypt and the Sudan—3

by J. C. Hurewitz

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The suspension on May 6 of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations begun on April 27 concerning the withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal Zone and the resulting tension foreshadow delay also in settlement of the other major issue at stake between Britain and Egypt—the future of the Sudan.

Reviewing Anglo-Egyptian relations since 1885, when Egypt withdrew from the Sudan, Muhammad Bey (later Pashā) Salah-al-Din, the Egyptian foreign minister, on August 26, 1950 told Sir Ralph Stevenson, the British ambassador in Cairo, that Britain must evacuate its forces from Egypt and the Sudan at once so as to "ensure the complete independence of . . . [both] as one integral whole." "Your résumé of the past is perfectly correct," replied Sir Ralph, "but the deductions you drew are not so correct. The fact is that the Sudanese are demanding independence."

The attitudes of Britain and Egypt on the Sudan have remained inflexible since 1946. Following the failure of the negotiations of 1946-47 Egypt, on October 15, 1951, unilaterally abrogated the 1899 condominium agreement and proclaimed the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian crown.

The unresolved Anglo-Egyptian deadlock resulted, in the Sudan, chiefly in hastening the development of autonomous institutions. Over Egypt's protest, the British governor-general promulgated on June 19, 1948 an ordinance enacting the recommendations of an Anglo-Sudanese conference. The Advisory Council for the Northern Provinces was transformed into a country-wide Legislative Assembly, vested with the right to initiate bills on purely internal affairs, except those relating to the organization of the government, defense, coinage and currency, and the minorities. An Executive Council, or embryonic cabinet, appointed by and responsible to the governor-general, was also created, comprising Sudanese and British ministers, with the former a majority. The Ashiqqa (pro-Egyptian) party boycotted the first election on November 15, 1948.

In response to the Legislative Assembly's resolution of mid-December 1950, calling for self-rule, the governor-general appointed a Sudanese constitutional commission under a British chairman the following March. On May 8, 1952 the Assembly adopted a draft self-government statute.

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The legislature, under the draft statute, was to be converted into a bicameral Parliament. Twenty members of the upper chamber, the Senate, were to be nominated by the governor-general. But the 30 others were to be elected, as were all the members of the House of Representatives. The governor-general was to appoint, from among the Representatives, the prime minister and, on the latter's advice, the remaining members of the cabinet (Council of Ministers), of whom at least two were to represent the Southern Provinces. The cabinet was to be accountable to Parliament. But the statute required the prime minister to inform the governor-general of all decisions on administration or proposed legislation.

Powers of Governor-General

The governor-general was to retain wide powers. He was to be endowed with full responsibility for external affairs and with special responsibility for the civil service and the Southern Provinces. Although the speakers who presided over both legislative chambers were to be elected by their respective bodies, the governor-general could withhold approval from the candidates. He was also to be empowered to appoint the clerk of Parliament, charged with its administration and staffing. Moreover, in the event of a constitutional breakdown, the governor-general was to exercise full legislative and executive authority, as in the early days of the condominium.

Britain on October 22, 1952 approved the draft statute, subject to

the rights previously reserved to the co-dominion. Meanwhile, following the *coup d'état* in Egypt on July 23, 1952, the military dictatorship had reopened negotiations with Britain for a settlement in the Sudan. Once the new regime had suppressed the political parties, Prime Minister Muhammad Nagib was no longer fettered by the irresponsible agitation of an opposition and could give and take freely in negotiations with the Sudanese as well as the British. By the end of October he had reached a tentative understanding with all the leading Sudanese factions, among

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them the Ummah (pro-independence) party.

The amendments of the draft self-government statute, recommended in the Egyptian-Sudanese accord, were substantially incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, signed on February 12, 1953. The statute is to come into force promptly. The election of the constituent legislature is to be supervised by a Mixed Electoral Commission of seven—three Sudanese appointed by the governor-general and one member each by the governments of Egypt, Britain, the United States and India (chairman). The constituent legislature is instructed to frame the permanent constitution and electoral law and to

decide the future status of the Sudan. In the period of transition from self-government to self-determination, which is not to exceed three years, the governor-general is to exercise his powers under the statute subject to the approval of a special commission of five—two Sudanese (one each nominated by the respective co-dominion, dependent on subsequent parliamentary confirmation), an Egyptian, a Briton and a Pakistani (chairman).

The very fact that Britain and Egypt were able to reach an agreement was notable in itself and could be credited in part to the good offices of Jefferson Caffery, United States ambassador in Cairo. Whether the instrument can be executed successfully hinges on Article 12, which stipulates that the constituent legislature, in determining the political future of the Sudan, may choose either to "link the Sudan with Egypt in any form" or to vote for complete independence. Britain holds the view that the second choice permits possible association with the British Commonwealth. Egypt insists that such an option is not explicitly written into the Anglo-Egyptian agreement and is therefore precluded. For the moment the issue is hypothetical. But when the time for decision arrives, the controversy may become practical—and explosive.

(This is the third of three articles, the first two of which appeared on March 15 and April 15, on the Anglo-Egyptian problem in the Sudan by Dr. Hurewitz, assistant professor of government, Near and Middle East Studies Program, School of International Affairs, Columbia University. His book, *Middle East Dilemmas: The Background of United States Policy*, is scheduled for June publication.)

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Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The complete turnover in the personnel of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Admiral Arthur Radford replacing General Omar N. Bradley as chairman, announced by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on May 12, emphasizes the extent to which the military have become a significant factor in this country's politics. Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, Republican leader in Congress, had contended that, with a change in the political leadership, it was also time for a change in the membership of the JCS on the ground that the Joint Chiefs had been appointed by a Democratic Administration—an argument which, had Senator Taft become President, would have required the retirement of General Eisenhower.

Earlier, on April 30, the President had asked the House of Representatives and Senate to authorize an "immediate improvement" in the military establishment by permitting revisions of the "unification" laws of 1947 and 1949. An important motive for this request is the weakness of civilian responsibility in the military establishment. As far as foreign policy is concerned, the President's proposals fail to get at the roots of this weakness.

Civilian and Military

The acts of 1947 and 1949 created two main centers of responsibility in the military establishment. One was civilian, in the person and office of the Secretary of Defense. When it became evident soon after the passage of the first unification law that this new officer had few real powers, his authority was increased in 1949. The other center is military, in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This institution,

informally created during World War II, derives specific powers from the postwar reorganization laws. The powers are considerable in the foreign policy field, first, because the JCS has the specific task of advising the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense on the strategic aspects of defense planning; and secondly, because the JCS has the staff (210 officers) needed for making military foreign-policy studies, while neither the Secretary of Defense nor any of the Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air has a comparable staff.

The result is that in most instances the JCS studies are presented to the National Security Council as the statements of the military establishment's position on whatever foreign policy issue is before the Council. The reorganization plan of April 30 does not strengthen the civilian Secretaries in these two respects. It leaves the Secretaries bereft of the powers or the staff to pass sound critical judgment on the findings of the JCS in world affairs. Thus the National Security Council, meant by Congress to be a civilian institution, inevitably has become a military and civilian institution.

The issue raised by the influence of the JCS is not whether the opinions the military men reach are less wise than the opinions of civilians (the generals and admirals are perhaps as sound in their thinking as most Secretaries who have served in the military establishment), but whether civilians responsible to the public or military men responsible to their commanders are to have a hand in the setting of public policy. Military

career men serve their country best when they are not distracted from their military duties by political controversy.

President Eisenhower's plan does note that "only by including civilian experts in the process of strategic planning can our military services bring new weapons rapidly into their established weapons systems, make recommendations with respect to the use of new systems of weapons in the future war plans, and see that the whole range of scientific information and knowledge of fundamental cost factors are taken into account in strategic planning." The civilians Mr. Eisenhower has in mind, however, are natural scientists and engineers; and not the geographers and political scientists who could assist the civilian Secretaries in coming to some conclusions of their own about the nature of the military establishment's interest in contemporary problems of foreign policy. The plan would improve the efficiency of the JCS by increasing the responsibility of the chairman, who now has no formal authority greater than that of each of the other members of the Joint Chiefs; Congress four years ago refused to entertain similar suggestions with respect to the chairman.

This interest in more efficiency in the JCS is not matched by recommendations for increasing the influence of the civilian Secretaries in the foreign policy field. Indeed, on the whole, the reorganization plan neglects the role of the military establishment in making foreign policy. The result is that the Joint Chiefs remain creators of policy proposals rather than advisers on policy.

BLAIR BOLLES



Indochina: Independence or Communism?

The invasion of Laos by the forces of the Communist Vietminh leader, Ho Chi Minh, raised problems far more complex for France, the United States, and the United Nations than those created by the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. As the West sees it, Ho Chi Minh is an instrument of the Chinese and/or Russian Communists, and his incursions into the areas of Indochina still controlled by the French is not a revolution but an act of aggression. Moscow and Peiping, for their part, insist that Ho Chi Minh is engaged in a struggle for the "liberation" of his people from French colonial rule. The French, although increasingly anxious to obtain outside assistance—armaments and financing at least, but if possible also manpower—have hitherto been reluctant to bring the Indochina problem before the United Nations, contending that it is a domestic, not an international, issue.

As Asians See It

Meanwhile the non-Communist Asian nations, several of which have but recently emerged from colonial status, have taken the position that the guerrilla warfare of Ho Chi Minh, dangerous as it may prove for neighboring lands, is a nationalist, even though Communist-led, uprising, which is not comparable to the Korean war and can be effectively countered only by the grant of independence to Indochina. The same view has been expressed by King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, who both in an interview published in *The New York Times* of April 19 and in a declaration made by his cabinet on May 4, demanded immediate independence as the price of

Cambodian resistance to the Vietminh—a demand partly met by France on May 9.

Western observers have been divided as to the role played by the U.S.S.R. and Communist China in Ho Chi Minh's attack on Laos. Some believe that Peiping acted independently after Stalin's death in encouraging the Vietminh; others claim the new Vietminh move accords with Stalin's pledge to the Russian Communist party's October 1952 Congress that the Kremlin would not engage in war with the West but would continue to aid "liberation" movements. The latter interpretation seems borne out by an important article published on May 6 in *Kommunist*, leading theoretical organ of the Russian Communist party, which declared that the Soviet policy of seeking a relaxation of tense relations with the West is a long-term program but that the U.S.S.R. will not abandon its "moral and political support" of colonial "liberation" movements.

In Indochina, as in a microcosm, are reflected some of the basic cross-currents of our times. It is understandable that the West, under the leadership of the United States, should want to check the further spread of communism in Asia, which, if victorious, might spell, for a time at least, the exclusion of the white man from the Asian mainland. The possibility of such exclusion is not a new development. It was foreshadowed by Japan's victory in 1905 over Tsarist Russia, then as now regarded by Asians primarily as a white Western nation; and more ominously by Tokyo's World War II slogan of "Asia for the Asians."

At the same time it is important to recall that resistance to the rise of nationalism in Asia has so far brought only defeat, if not worse, for the West. When Britain in two world wars urged India to fight at its side in defense of "freedom," the Indian nationalists asked the British how soon freedom would be granted to their people. The British in India, the French in Indochina, the Dutch in the Dutch East Indies, all made valuable contributions to the development of their respective colonial subjects, but these contributions did not prove an acceptable substitute for independence.

An increasing number of thoughtful and responsible Asians recognize that independence achieved through Communist activities will not bring freedom. But they do not believe that continuance of colonial rule can be reconciled with the crusade for democracy urged on them by the West. Representative of this view is the statement by Frank Moraes, editor of *The Times of India*, who in his recently issued book, *Report on Mao's China*, at many points critical of Peiping, says: "Had France relinquished her hold on Indochina, Ho Chi Minh might today have been the leader of a democratic Vietnam. A loosening of foreign political bonds in Asia must accompany an accretion of economic aid." It is this view that the non-Communist nations of Asia, the Middle East and Africa may be expected to stress if the Indochina problem is brought before the United Nations.

— VERA MICHELES DEAN.

(Mrs. Dean's new book, *Foreign Policy Without Fear*, has just been published by McGraw-Hill.)



Constitutional Reform in France

by Gordon Wright

Dr. Wright, professor of history at the University of Oregon, is the author of *The Reshaping of French Democracy* (New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1948) and *Raymond Poincaré and the French Presidency* (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1942).

The French municipal elections of April 26 and May 3 indicated three major trends: (1) an increase in the strength of the Independents, led by former Premier Antoine Pinay, which may weaken the René Mayer government; (2) the continued strength of the Communist party, which again won about 25 percent of the total vote; and (3) the decision of General de Gaulle to withdraw his party from parliamentary politics and concentrate instead on the fulfillment of its "mission," which the general described as that of serving "as an advanced guard for regrouping the people to change the regime."

Making Democracy Work

These developments focus attention anew on current efforts in France to effect constitutional reform. Parliamentary government in France, remarks the staid and scholarly British weekly, *The Economist*, appears to the outsider as "an interregnum of dissent between spells of chaos." The most recent of these lapses into chaos occurred in the closing hours of 1952, when the Pinay cabinet collapsed after a nine-month effort to stabilize France's shaky financial structure. For several years each cabinet crisis has produced deeper discontent with the French governmental system and a louder clamor for fundamental reform. This clamor reached a new climax after Pinay's fall. The new year brought a rash of newspaper and magazine articles demanding constitutional revision; and it also brought a promise from Pinay's successor, René Mayer, that

his new government would give this question top priority on its agenda.

The problem of making democracy work in France is by no means a new one. It would be hard to find a time during the past century when Frenchmen were generally satisfied with their governmental system and when various discontented groups were not trying to alter or replace that system. The Third Republic during its later years was subjected to growing criticism on the ground that it failed to produce stable and vigorous governments which could tackle the complex problems of 20th-century society. The Fourth Republic, established after World War II under the constitution of 1946, has inherited that legacy of dissatisfaction, since it appears to have corrected none of the evils of the Third. Weak coalition cabinets still succeed one another at intervals of a few months; parties and politicians seem content to play the political game according to the old-fashioned rules, often without apparent concern for the nation's critical needs. Chronic inflation steadily undermines the economy, yet no premier is able to persuade his backers to undertake the painful task of stabilization. Meanwhile, dissension over foreign policy impairs the nation's unity, morale and international prestige.

French reformers, in their effort to improve the governmental machinery, propose a triple set of changes: in the electoral law, in Parliament's rules of conduct, and in the constitution itself.

The electoral system which post-

war France has used is a modified version of proportional representation. Its effect has been to perpetuate a multiparty system, with six parties about equally balanced in the National Assembly. It has also made the parties more rigid and disciplined than was the case in the Third Republic, for deputies have come to be more dependent on the party for re-nomination at each general election.

Multiparty System

In theory, this increased rigidity of parties ought to make governmental coalitions more stable. In practice, such has not been the case. The principal effect seems to be that cabinet coalitions are now harder to form than they used to be. Another consequence of the proportional system is that it has protected the large minority parties—the Communists and Gaullists—on the extreme left and right. For this reason it was altered somewhat in 1951 to give an advantage to parties which ally themselves for electoral purposes. The effect was to cut back Communist representation in the National Assembly by about one-third and to keep the rise of Gaullist power within bounds. Without that amendment the Fourth Republic might have become completely ungovernable after the 1951 elections.

Some critics of this electoral system see it as the basic flaw in France's governmental structure, far more important than any constitutional weaknesses. They argue that the real barrier to efficient cabinet government is the multiparty system and that the

task of achieving a stable majority can be accomplished only if something approaching a two-party structure emerges. They propose, therefore, the adoption of an electoral system not used in France for more than a century. Its two key provisions would be (1) large multi-member electoral districts, with each party presenting a list of candidates equal to the number of seats, and (2) election by mere plurality of the leading party's entire list. This system, its sponsors contend, would put such a premium on electoral coalitions that soon only two or three major groups would remain. Then these coalitions, instead of disintegrating after election day (as is now the case), would probably develop into complete mergers within a few years. Real majority government by a single party might at last become possible in France.

There is much to be said for this scheme, but none of the center parties is prepared to risk the possible danger that it might redound to the benefit of the Communists in those parts of France which are strongly leftist and anticlerical by tradition, or to the reactivated Gaullists.

If, therefore, an electoral reform does occur before the next elections, it will probably be of another sort: a return to the traditional system of the Third Republic. Such a change is strongly favored by all of the right-center parties which have dominated the government since 1951; it also has much support among the Socialists. Its sponsors claim that it will break the power of party machines and will free individual deputies to follow their own consciences rather than the dictates of the irresponsible party hierarchy. Behind this laudable aim, however, is the shrewd conviction that the old electoral system would benefit the highly individualistic, loosely disciplined

right-center groups. That it would produce stronger or more effective government in France is open to grave doubt. The example of the Third Republic's declining years is scarcely one to arouse the enthusiasm of Frenchmen dissatisfied with their present governmental weakness and instability.

Functioning of Parliament

A second category of reforms which is considered necessary by many Frenchmen concerns the internal functioning of Parliament. The National Assembly makes its own rules and can alter them without need for constitutional revision. Critics have pointed out for decades that the legislative process in France is clumsy and inefficient and that the effect is to destroy popular confidence in democratic methods. These reformers urge, therefore, that the Assembly stop trying to legislate in detail on everything from Army appropriations to the number of stallions on the national stud-farms. They would have the Assembly reduce its inhuman burden by various devices, such as adopting general *lois-cadres*, or "framework-laws," which might then be filled in by administrative action. The reformers also contend that the Assembly's system of specialized standing committees, which in their opinion impedes a vigorous governmental program, ought to be revamped or abolished. Reform of the Assembly's habits and procedures, however, will not come easily. Despite the critics, the legislators are intensely jealous of their prerogatives, and it seems unlikely that any major improvements will occur soon.

There remains the question of the constitution itself. That document has never won the respect or the affection of Frenchmen. When it was ratified in 1946, only 9 million

citizens gave it their support, while 16 million voted against or stayed away from the polls. Revisionism was in the air from the very beginning; and pressure for change has increased by fits and starts since then. In November 1950 Parliament adopted a resolution initiating the amendment of 11 specified articles of the constitution. An Assembly committee at once undertook to draft new versions of those articles, but two years passed and the task was still unfinished. This lack of progress, along with the explosion of discontent which accompanied the fall of the Pinay cabinet in 1952, led Premier René Mayer to appoint a cabinet minister, Paul Coste-Floret, whose sole task was to speed constitutional revision.

What Kind of Revision?

But the problem of revision is not so simple as all that. One reason for the failure of the reformers to push through a single amendment since 1946 is the complexity of the amending process itself. The constitution's authors sought to guard against hasty changes by requiring (Article 90) a popular referendum unless Parliament adopts an amendment by a large majority (two-thirds of the lower house or three-fifths in both houses). The Socialists and Communists, who oppose any fundamental amendments, have so far been strong enough to make either of these procedures risky. Some Frenchmen hold, therefore, that top priority should be given to an all-out effort to amend Article 90 in order to simplify the amending process. Efforts are also being made to secure a judicial re-interpretation of Article 90 so that a three-fifths majority of those deputies and senators *present and voting* (rather than of the total membership) would be sufficient.

There is, however, a much more

important reason why the revisionists have not yet attained real results. After all, the revisionist parties probably have a clear majority in the country and, since the 1951 elections, a three-fifths margin in the two houses of Parliament. If united, therefore, they should be able to proceed under Article 90 as it stands. But they are not united. Although most of them concur on certain issues, there are wide enough differences on several important points to make agreement difficult.

Gaullist View

In general, the revisionists fall into three categories. The first group, which was also the most extreme and intransigent, was the Gaullist RPF (Ralliement du Peuple Français). The Gaullists have insisted ever since 1946 that the whole spirit and structure of the regime must be changed. They stress especially the need for a powerful executive, with the right to dissolve the National Assembly at will and with authority to appeal to the people by referendum in cases of legislative-executive conflict. The Gaullists propose to grant this authority, not to the premier, but to the president of the republic. Their program appears to call for the transmutation of the latter into a quasi-American-type president and of the premier into a quasi-British-type prime minister. The relationship between them remains one of the major uncertainties of the Gaullist blueprint. The RPF has also favored an increase in the powers of the upper house, the Council of the Republic, and its conversion into a semicorporative body.

The Gaullist program goes far beyond the wishes of the second major revisionist group, the centrist and rightist parties (Radical Socialists, Independent Republicans, and Peasants). These elements look back nos-

taligically at the prewar era and seek to make the Fourth Republic as much like the Third as possible. Their primary emphasis is upon a return to true bicameralism by restoring to the Council of the Republic most of the powers of the old Senate. The upper house has long been the special preserve of the right-center groups, since it is chosen by a special electoral system which gives great weight to the votes of the small-town and rural populations. They contend that this change would restore "balance" to the parliamentary system and that it would check hasty, demagogic action by the lower house. The right-center parties also propose to strengthen the executive somewhat by restoring two of the cabinet's prewar privileges: the power to dissolve the Assembly and the right to issue decrees with the force of law, when so authorized by the Assembly. It has been easy for the Gaullists to point out that neither of these prerogatives produced effective government before 1940.

Threat of Dissolution

The third major revisionist element, the Christian Democratic MRP (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) takes a more restrained approach. Its leaders were among the principal authors of the 1946 constitution; it therefore seeks to correct and improve that constitution, not to amend it out of existence. MRP spokesmen favor a number of more or less minor changes to correct technical flaws in the functioning of the system. More important, however, is their advocacy of the dissolution power for the premier. They vainly proposed the freer use of that power while the constitution was being drafted in 1946 but were then forced to compromise because of Socialist and Communist opposition. They now point out that dissolution in its

present restricted form (Article 51) is totally inoperative; and they contend that there can be no stable and effective government until the premier can use the threat of dissolution to keep the Assembly in line.

Although these three programs overlap one another, the differences of approach have been enough to prevent any vigorous unified drive for reform. When Parliament decided in 1950 to amend 11 articles, it prudently by-passed the more controversial issues and confined itself to articles of secondary importance. Even these reforms remained entangled in committee until Premier Mayer took office in January, 1953. Mayer's urging finally drove the committee to report out a bill covering the 11 articles and to place it before Parliament in May 1953. Meanwhile, Mayer announced that his cabinet intended to push for two more-sweeping amendments, authorizing the premier to issue decrees-laws and to dissolve the Assembly without complex restrictions.

Thanks to Mayer's activity, some degree of constitutional revision now seems an imminent reality. Yet there is reason to believe that revisionism may bog down short of really significant successes. The chief threat comes, not from the left-wing opponents of revision, but from dissension among the revisionist parties themselves. The harmony of the right-center coalition is endangered both by differences over the rearmament of West Germany and by a growing rivalry between two political factions headed by Mayer and Pinay. This dissension may not interfere with the adoption of relatively innocuous constitutional reforms like those included in the 11 articles, but it may force the postponement of more controversial proposals designed to strengthen and stabilize the executive.

"What is needed," suggests *The Economist*, "is not a method whereby weak governments can be prolonged in office or given powers to legislate by decree, but a means of creating strong governments." One may legitimately doubt whether any program except that of the Gaullists could fulfill that need. But the Gaullist program offers little real hope to the friends of French democracy. For one thing, it contains too many potential booby-traps, such as the relationship between president and premier. Worse still, it arouses too many traditional doubts and suspicions on the part of the non-Communist left and serves to divide Frenchmen rather than to bring them together. "General de Gaulle," remarks one leftist, "has made himself a national problem rather than a solution to France's problems." Short of a major upheaval, there is little prospect that the Gaullist plan can be adopted, and there is even less prospect that it would operate without severe stresses and strains.

Change Under Way

France needs change — political, economic and psychological change. On that fundamental point most Frenchmen and foreigners will agree. What is often overlooked is the fact

that changes are occurring in France, just as in every other Western country. The process is perhaps much too slow for an age of crisis; yet it is more rapid than many people suppose. In the long run these evolutionary—almost geological—changes are more likely to preserve French democracy than any amount of constitution-tinkering. They portend a modified social and economic structure, a new type of industrial, technical and agricultural leadership, and perhaps a more widely diffused sense of civic responsibility.

Until this evolution produces measurable results, however, a heavy burden of responsibility must rest on the present leaders of France. Their primary task is to reconcile the conflicts among the various center parties, for, as Maurice Duverger points out, "without this reconciliation no real governmental stability can be assured, whatever may be the constitutional reforms." At the same time the center leaders must somehow hold the support of the bulk of Frenchmen without falling back upon demagogic appeals to the special interests of their respective voting groups.

It may be that the tasks of this era are too great for France's present leaders and that the republic is fated

to progressive decadence and final collapse. Some sincere and patriotic Frenchmen take this pessimistic view and have turned to the Gaullist solution as the only way to save the republic from its own weakness. Yet perhaps they have given up too soon. The record of the postwar years is a spotty one, but it is not all black. Neither French leadership nor the French political system can yet be described as clear-cut failures. Indeed, to make democracy work at all in a country with such a complex political, social and economic heritage is a considerable achievement. There is still hope that the Fourth Republic, unreconstructed and unloved, may continue to muddle through.

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